Introduction
The labor force participation rate of married women has increased substantially in most developed countries in the last three to four decades. Participation increases have been strongest at younger ages but have been large at older ages as well. For example, the participation rate of married West German women aged 55 to 60 rose from 31.7 to about 40 percent between 1985 and 1994 1 (Bundesminister, 1996) . A similar pattern in the United
States was documented by Perrachi and Welch (1994) . As a result of this trend, it is increasingly common for both spouses in married couples to be employed as they approach the typical age range of retirement from the labor force. This raises interesting questions about the relationship between the labor force behavior of husbands and wives in older married couples. Does the employment status of one spouse affect the labor force transition behavior of the other spouse? What is the role of financial incentives in these transition decisions? Are the effects of economic variables symmetric, or do the characteristics of husbands affect the behavior of wives differently from the way wives' characteristics affect their husbands' behavior? How do health and age of the spouses affect these relationships? Is there evidence that past labor force decisions affect current behavior?
These and related questions are of inherent scientific interest, but are also potentially important for public policy. Recent reforms and proposed changes in public pension plans in many countries will alter the incentives and opportunities for husbands and wives to coordinate their labor force behavior. The financial and labor market impact of such reforms will depend in part on the relationship between the labor force behavior of older spouses, so understanding this behavior is important.
3 Private pensions provided by firms are common in Germany, but they provide much smaller benefits than in most other industrialized countries. A 1990 survey indicated that about 65 percent of German employees are covered by a firm pension. The payments from such pension programs are small: About 52 percent of all recipients receive less than DM 200 per month, and another 14 percent receive between DM 200 and 300 (Heppt, 1995) . On average pensions make up less than six percent of retirement income.
3 Section 2 provides a brief overview of the regulations affecting couples' retirement in Germany. Section 3 describes the conceptual basis for the analysis and the econometric model. Section 4 describes the data, and section 5 presents and discusses the estimation results. Conclusions are given in section 6.
Public Pensions in Germany
The central features of the German public pension system have been in place since 1957. Every worker pays a fixed proportion of gross income (up to a maximum taxable level)
into the system. This contribution is matched by employers. Retirement benefits are a function of lifetime contributions to the pension system. Those who contributed more because of higher earnings or a longer contribution period receive higher benefits. The average replacement rate is about 60 percent of lifetime average income, net of taxes. This is substantially higher than the average net replacement rate in the United States Social Security system, which is under 50 percent (ignoring spouse benefits). Compared to the United States, the German retirement system is not very progressive, with the replacement rate declining only moderately as income rises. With the exception of survivors' benefits, there are no special regulations regarding couples. Individual benefits are not adjusted for the presence of a spouse or other dependents, unlike in the United States Social Security system. In households in which both spouses qualify for public pension benefits, benefits are paid based on the individual contributions of husband and wife. There is no benefit reduction for couples.
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For the period under investigation in this study the minimum age at which a non- 4 In order to qualify for disability retirement individuals must have contributed for at least five years to the retirement insurance including three of the last five years. In addition they have to provide a physician's medical recommendation. Over 60 percent of all disability-retirement applicants have been granted benefits. 5 Frequently the term 'pre-retirement' is used in a description of German retirement entry rules, but this term has no precise definition. It is sometimes used to characterize a situation in which an individual is unemployed, and collecting unemployment insurance benfits, possibly with 4 disabled woman could receive retirement benefits was 60. To qualify for retirement benefits at age 60 she must have contributed to the public retirement plan for at least 15 years of which at least 10 years must have been accumulated after age 40. In general, men could not receive retirement benefits before age 63 ('retirement after long-term contributions'), which required 35 contribution years. For men with fewer than 35 contribution years and women with fewer than 15 contribution years the age at which benefits could be received was 65.
There are three exceptions to these general rules: For disabled individuals there is no minimum retirement age; for the severely handicapped with at least 35 contribution years and for 'long-term unemployed' workers the minimum retirement age was 60. 4 Unemployed workers who have reached age 60 and who have been unemployed for at least 12 out of the previous 18 months can claim retirement benefits if they have accumulated at least 15 contribution years and if they have contributed to the retirement insurance system during eight of the previous ten years. Recent unemployment rates for workers aged 55-59 in the Western states of Germany have been almost double the overall West German unemployment rates for men of all ages. This is believed to be related to the fact that the long-term unemployed may begin to receive retirement benefits at age 60. It is common for firms to lay off an older worker as many months before age 60 as the worker's unemployment benefits will run (up to 32 months since 1987). Until the worker reaches age 60, he or she receives public unemployment benefits which are at times supplemented by voluntary one time lump-sum or regular monthly payments from the former employer (Jacobs, et al., 1991) .
additional payments from a former employer. It may be used to refer to individuals who receive disability retirement benefits, and it may be applied to describe severely handicapped individuals who retired after reaching age 60. If one uses working until age 63 or 65 as a reference point for regular retirement, then even women who started to receive old-age retirement benefits at age 60 may be pre-retired.
6 See Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) for a thorough description of the model, and van Soest (1995) for a recent empirical application.
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The Retirement Reform of 1992 mandated a phased increase in the minimum age at which full retirement benefits can be received for women, the long term unemployed, and 35-year contributors. New early retirement regulations allow individuals to retire prior to age 65 in exchange for a benefit reduction, and encourage part-time work by the elderly. The German retirement system is likely to undergo further reforms as a result of population aging: Börsch-Supan (1997) calculated that in order to maintain current replacement rates, the contribution rate would have to increase from the current rate of about 20 percent of gross earnings (shared by employers and employees) to about 35 percent. Thus, coordination of labor force behavior of married couples may increase in importance in the future as greater flexibility is introduced in the public pension system in Germany.
An Econometric Model of Employment Transitions of Older Couples
The traditional approach to analyzing labor force behavior of married couples is based on the family labor supply model, in which behavior is determined by maximization of a single utility function subject to a family budget constraint in which income is pooled and the allocation of consumption between the spouses is not modeled. 6 This approach has obvious limitations that have been widely noted: the spouses may have different preferences, making it difficult to justify aggregating preferences; and they may have different outside opportunities, making it difficult to justify pooling income (Chiappori, 1988; Kooreman and Kapteyn, 1990; McElroy, 1990) . Nevertheless, the family labor supply model is still commonly used because it is simple and has less stringent data requirements than bargaining models based on cooperative game theory, such as McElroy and Horney (1981) , Manser and Brown (1980) , and Chiappori (1988 and Chiappori ( , 1992 . Our analysis is mainly descriptive, so we do not propose a specific behavioral model as a basis for the estimation. We specify an econometric model that is flexible enough to be considered as an approximation to the employment decision rules derived from either a dynamic family labor supply model or a dynamic cooperative bargaining model. The specification allows for the possibility that income is not pooled. We do not assume that the parameters of the model can be interpreted as preference parameters; rather, we recognize that they may represent some combination of the preferences of the husband, the preferences of the wife, the relative bargaining power of the husband and wife, and expectations of future random variables. We do not attempt to identify structural parameters from the approximation model -such a task is difficult in a static model of the behavior of couples and has to our knowledge not been attempted in a dynamic model.
We define four discrete states based on the employment status of the husband and wife:
1: Both spouses are employed; 2: The husband is employed, the wife is not employed; 3: The husband is not employed, the wife is employed; 4: Both spouses are not employed.
Including part time work as a separate state would be of considerable interest, but the resulting model has nine states with far too many infrequently observed transitions to make estimation feasible. It would also be of interest to allow unemployment and nonparticipation in the labor force to be distinct states, but for similar reasons this is not feasible. Therefore we consider transitions among states defined only by employment and nonemployment. Cases in which both spouses change employment status in the same month are rare: of almost 1,400
transitions observed in the data, only 25 involved both spouses changing employment status in the same month. Such a small number of joint transitions makes it infeasible to model the determinants of such transitions. Therefore, we reclassify these 25 cases so that one of the spouses is assumed to change employment status in the month before the transition month reported in the survey. In other words, joint transitions are reclassified to yield a sequence in which one spouse changes states in the month following the other spouse's transition. See the Appendix for details.
Let y ijkRt represent the expected present discounted value (EPDV) of making a transition from state i to state j for couple k currently in the t'th period of their R'th observed spell. If behavior is determined by a family labor supply model then y can be interpreted as discounted utility. In a bargaining model y can be thought of as a measure of the couple's social welfare, with the weights placed on each spouse's utility implicitly determining the form of the social welfare function. As indicated above, we do not specify a structural model;
rather we specify a linear approximation to the underlying function that determines y:
where E kt = a vector of wage and retirement benefit variables.
X kt = a vector of exogenous regressors, some of which may not depend on t.
S kR = a vector of lagged dependent variables such as the state occupied in the previous spell.
f(t) = a vector of indicators of the duration of the current spell.
Z kt = a vector of potentially endogenous variables.
µ k and * R = permanent, and spell-specific error components.
, ijkRt = a serially independent shock
"'s, $'s, and D's = parameters to be estimated. For computational tractability, we assume that , ijkRt follows the extreme value distribution. The probability that couple k makes a transition from state i to state j after the t'th period of the R'th spell, conditional on the error components, is therefore with ™ ijkRt = y ijkRt -, ijkRt , and j( ) denoting the absence of joint transitions in the data due to the reclassification described above. Conditional on the error components, the model consists of four multinomial logit equations for transitions from the four labor force states defined above, with three possible outcomes for each origin state: the husband changes employment status, the wife changes employment status, or neither spouse changes. The models are linked by their dependence on the common unobserved random effects. Let
moves from state i to state j after t periods in the R'th spell, otherwise. The d ijkRt ' 0 likelihood contribution of the t'th period in couple k's R'th spell, conditional on µ and *, is
The likelihood contribution of couple k's R'th spell, conditional on µ, is where B 2b is the probability that the spell-specific error component takes on the value , b * b = 1,..., B, and D kR is the duration (censored or otherwise) of couple k's R'th spell. Finally, suppose that there are F initial conditions, i.e. variables that have been determined in part by µ, such as elapsed duration of the spell in progress when the couple is first observed, or total labor force experience and tenure of each member of the couple. An equation for the value of the f'th initial condition, I kf , is The likelihood contribution for couple k is where B 1a is the probability that the permanent factor takes on value , a = 1,..., A, is µ a G k the number of spells observed for the k'th couple, H k is the number of years for which the k'th couple is observed, and J is an index of the year of the observation. Finally, the sample loglikelihood function is where K is the number of couples.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use data provided by the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), a nationally representative household panel study. Approximately 6,000 households in the western states of Germany (the former West Germany) have been interviewed annually since 1984.
Households from the former East Germany were added to the sample in 1990 but are not included in the analysis here. We use data from the 1984 through 1994 interviews. We restrict our sample to married couples in which at least one spouse is in the age range of 50 to 69.
Observations are censored upon dissolution of the marriage for any reason, or if data are missing on labor force status and on crucial explanatory variables, such as health, years of 7 An individual appears in our sample as long as he or she remains married to the spouse to whom he or she was married in the first year of the survey (1984) or the first year of eligibility for the estimation sample (age 50). Modeling divorce is beyond the scope of the analysis. In some cases labor force status was missing for only one or two months. In order to avoid losing all the subsequent information from these cases we imputed labor force status for months with missing data if the number of consecutive months with missing data was three or less. Details of the imputation procedure and other data issues are described in an Appendix available upon request. 11 schooling, or work experience (see Table A -1 in the Appendix for a summary of censoring mechanisms).
7 The estimation sample contains 1,553 couples with 2,928 spells observed for a total of 99,010 months, where as noted above a spell is defined by the employment status of both spouses.
The labor force participation behavior of the couples in our sample is summarized in Figures 1 and 2 . At age 50, 95 percent of the husbands and 57 percent of the wives are employed. By age 65, the participation rates drop to 11 percent for the husbands and five percent for wives. Figure 2 describes the distribution of couples' joint labor force states by the age of the husband. At age 50 of the husband, it is more common to observe both spouses working than the husband working and the wife not employed. By age 57 the latter is more common. This is in part due to the trend toward increased employment of married women discussed earlier: more recent cohorts of wives, who are observed at younger ages in the data, are more likely to be employed, which causes a higher frequency of state 1 observations for younger couples. The incidence of state 3, in which only the wife is employed, peaks at age 62 of the husband, but is far lower than that of other states until age 64. State 4, with both spouses not working, is the most frequently observed state for couples with husbands older than 61 years.
The distribution of couple-months by employment state and the average monthly transition probabilities are described in Table 1 . This summary of the data shows strong connections between the labor force behavior of spouses. The average monthly probability that a husband stops working when the wife is employed (163) is 0.48 percent, while the probability that a husband stops working when the wife is not employed (264) is 0.93 percent.
Similarly, wives of employed husbands leave employment (162) at an average monthly rate of 1.05 percent, and wives whose husbands are not employed leave employment (364) at an average monthly rate of 1.82 percent. The likelihood that a husband enters employment is 0.94 percent if his wife is employed (361) and 0.27 percent if she is not employed (462), and a similar pattern holds for the rate at which wives enter employment as a function of the husband's employment status (0.92 versus 0.21 percent). Table 2 describes the distribution of the number of spells per couple. Close to sixty percent of the couples remain in just one spell for the entire period and another 30 percent switch states only one or two times. Nevertheless, Table 3 shows that with the exception of state 4 (both spouses not employed), the majority of spells is not censored.
The main finding from the above description of the data is that one member of an older married couple is much more likely to exit employment and much less likely to enter employment if his or her spouse is not employed than if the spouse is employed. This pattern, which we call coordination in transition behavior, is also observed in the United States (Blau, 1998) , and Hurd (1990, p. 232 ) has offered a number of possible explanations for it. These include assortative mating on tastes or economic variables such as wages and retirement benefits, correlation in assets, and complementarity of husband's and wife's leisure in utility.
The effect of changes in retirement regulations on this pattern may depend on the underlying cause of the pattern, so in the remainder of the paper we analyze which, if any, observed covariates can help account for this pattern.
We look for three types of patterns in the effects of covariates. First, we look for evidence of cross-spouse wage and retirement benefit effects. For example, if the wife's retirement benefit has a positive effect on her exit from employment and also has a positive effect on the likelihood that her husband exits employment or a negative effect on the likelihood that he enters employment, this would suggest that complementarity of leisure is part of the explanation for the pattern. Second, we explore cross-spouse effects of other covariates. For example, a man who is in poor health is more likely to exit employment than a healthy man, and if his poor health status also increases his wife's exit rate from employment then this could help account for the observed pattern of transition coordination. Finally, we look for differences in covariate effects by the spouse's employment status. For example, if the wife's poor health has a bigger positive effect on her employment exit rate when her husband is not employed than when he is employed, we would interpret this as evidence that assortative mating on unobservables or correlation across spouses in unobserved tastes play a role in explaining the pattern. We distinguish this case from complementarity of leisure because the latter has a very specific interpretation in models of family labor supply: the sign of the cross-spouse substitution effect of a change in the wage rate.
Descriptive statistics on the covariates are shown in Table 4 . The covariates are derived from the annual surveys and do not vary by month within a year, except for spell duration and variables describing previous spells. Wages and benefits are likely to be endogenous to transition rates and wages (benefits) are unobserved for nonworkers (workers).
We therefore estimated wage and benefit equations (separately for husbands and wives) on the subsamples with observed values, and used the estimates to predict wages and benefits for every sample member for every year. The predicted wage and benefit variables are estimates of the monthly wage that a person could earn were he or she to work in a given year, net of taxes, and the monthly public retirement benefit to which an individual would be entitled if he or she were to exit employment in that year, net of taxes. However, many women have not contributed to the public retirement system for enough years to be entitled to any benefit. Therefore, we also estimated an equation to explain whether a nonemployed married woman is employer's interests; also, they are not necessarily covered by the retirement insurance which is mandatory for blue and white collar workers. Public sector workers have a particularly low risk of layoff. In addition public sector workers have higher retirement benefits than is common in the private sector. Civil servants receive benefits according to an entirely different set of rules than individuals in the private sector, and non-civil servant employees in the public sector benefit from a significant pension in addition to the benefits from the mandatory retirement scheme. 10 The only information available on private pensions is whether an individual is covered by one, and this was asked only of employees, so we do not use this variable. No information on financial assets is available. We use an indicator of home ownership as a crude proxy for assets. 15 nationality and household ownership, household size, the national unemployment rate, and five regional dummies. In addition, several variables characterizing the current spell are incorporated, including the elapsed duration of the spell in progress when the couple is first observed, a quartic in duration of the spell in progress, a dummy for whether the current spell is the first spell observed for the couple, and dummies for whether the couple has ever previously occupied state i, i=1,...,4.
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Results
We estimated many different specifications of the employment transition models. These specifications included alternative sets of restrictions on the effects of wages and benefits, alternative polynomials on spell duration, alternative specifications of the effects of prior spells, alternative specifications of health, different characterizations of jobs, interactions between husband and wife characteristics, alternative numbers of discrete factors characterizing the unobserved heterogeneity distribution, alternative numbers of masspoints in the distribution of each factor, and alternative sets of equations for potentially endogenous initial conditions. A summary of the results of the specification tests is given in the Appendix.
The model presented here is based on the results of specification tests, although in some cases we retain a relatively parsimonious version of a given variable despite rejection by the specification tests in order to avoid an excessive number of parameters. The results discussed below are from a model that includes one permanent discrete factor with three points of support, an equation to explain the initial employment state in which the couple is observed, unrestricted wage and benefit effects, and no interactions among husband and wife variables.
Coefficient estimates and standard errors are given in the Appendix. The magnitudes of the coefficient estimates provide little information about the size of the covariate effects in a nonlinear model, so we do not discuss them. Instead, we used the estimates to simulate the impact of changes in each covariate on the transition rates. The simulations were computed for each couple-month observed in a given state and averaged over the couple-months in that state, allowing one covariate at a time to change while letting the others remain at their observed values. The simulation results are shown in Table 5 . The first two rows of Table 5 show the actual transition rates and the rates predicted from the estimates using the actual values of all covariates. The model fits the average transition rates well except for overpredicting the rate at which husbands enter employment when the wife is not employed (462).
Economic Variables
With a few exceptions the effects of wages and benefits are in the expected direction:
higher wages and lower benefits are associated with a stronger attachment to the labor force.
The response to a given change in wages and benefits is generally larger for women than for men, consistent with the generally higher labor supply elasticities for women than men found in the literature. The own-wage effects on the exit probability from the joint employment state imply an elasticity of .50 for husbands and .88 for wives.
In addition, we find a number of sizeable cross-spouse effects. 11 Having a high-wage
The finding differs from Blau's (1998) results for the United States.
husband generally increases the labor force mobility of wives, making them both more likely to enter the labor force when they are out and to leave the labor force when they are in.
Husbands of high-earning wives have increased probabilities of exiting employment and reduced probabilities of entering employment. Having a wife who receives high retirement benefits increases the exit rate from employment for husbands whose wives are already retired and reduces their entry rate to employment. This is an interesting example of coordination in labor force behavior: the response of the husband's labor force exit probability to a change in the wife's wage rate is seven times larger if the wife is out of the labor force than if she is employed. The same pattern appears in the response of husbands to wives' expected retirement benefits: higher benefits for the wife are associated with increased labor force exit and reduced entry probabilities if the wife is not employed, but not if she is employed.
Finally, a number of the cross-spouse wage and benefit effects are asymmetric between the spouses. The effects of husbands' financial characteristics on exit probabilities out of state 2 are in the opposite direction to the effects of wives' characteristics on exit probabilities out of state 3. Higher retirement benefits of the husband increase the wife's reemployment probability and the husband's exit probability, but higher retirement benefits of a working wife reduce husbands' reemployment probabilities and the likelihood of wives' exit. Similarly, having a husband with high benefit claims induces wives to leave state 1, but the effect of having a wife with high benefits has a small negative effect on husbands probabilities of leaving state 1.
Effects of Health
We specified models that included several different health indicators that are available in the dataset. However, the health measures provided in the GSOEP are not as varied and detailed as those provided in other datasets, such as the U.S. Health and Retirement Study (HRS). For example, the GSOEP does not contain measures of functional limitations. We could not reject the hypotheses that a measure of subjective health satisfaction and the presence and degree of an officially recognized handicap had no impact on the transition rates.
The only health variables included in the final specification are indicators for the presence of a chronic disease for each spouse. We recognize that chronic disease may not be the best indicator of health for purposes of explaining labor force behavior. 
Transition Dynamics
Almost sixty percent of couples in the sample never leave their first observed spell during the period of analysis, so it is of interest to compare behavior between first spells and subsequent spells. Being in the first spell reduces the exit rate from employment of husbands but increases the wife's exit rate. There is strong duration dependence in most of the transition rates, positive for exits from employment and negative for entry to employment.
Another strong indicator of history dependence in couples' transition processes is the effect of having previously occupied a given state. The simulations show large increases in the probability of transiting into another state if the couple has been in that state in the past.
Covariate Effects and Coordination of Transition Behavior
The wage and benefit effects lend some support to the hypothesis of complementarity of leisure of the spouses, although not all of the results are consistent with the hypothesis.
However, we find that the effects of several of the covariates on a given spouse's transition probabilities depend on the employment status of the other spouse. Examples of such effects are that (i) the husband's response to changes in the wife's earnings depend on the wife's labor force status; (ii) wives become less attached to the labor force in response to a husband's chronic disease if the husband is out of the labor force himself, but not if he is employed; and (iii) aging reduces the entry probabilities of wives about three times as much when the husband has already left the labor force than when he is still working. These effects suggest that spouses do coordinate their leisure in response to unobserved correlations in tastes.
Conclusions
The This indicates that complementarity of leisure is an important determinant of the labor force behavior of older couples, confirming findings from other countries (e.g. Zweimüller et al., 1996; Blau, 1998; and Hurd, 1990) .
The results have a number of policy implications. The findings call for consideration of the added dimension of joint couple behavior in the ongoing regulatory reforms of the retirement system in Germany and in other industrialized countries. for missing spells with a duration of one month, first B then A for missing spells with a duration of two months and the sequence B-A-A for missing spells with a duration of three months. By this mechanism 143 missing spells of duration 1, 74 missing spells of duration 2, and 66 missing spells of duration 3 months were imputed.
Observations with missing spells between informative spells that exceeded four months in duration were censored, as were observations with missing spells at the end of their observation period. Observations with missing spells at the beginning of their observation period were dropped from the sample. The procedure raised additional problems in the case of two couples who not only had joint transitions, but who also had changed their states in period t-1, such that a recoding of the transition in period t-1 would have caused another joint transition, this time between periods t-2 and period t-1. The problem was solve by arbitrarily reassigning the couples' state in period t-1. (3800 -800 DM)
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